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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model that can explain identity switching activities among a stereotyped
population, such as passing and selective out-migration, based on the group reputation model de-
veloped in Kim and Loury (2008). The more talented members of the population, who gain more
by separating themselves from the masses, have a greater incentive to pass for an advantaged group
with a higher collective reputation (incurring some cost of switching) or differentiate themselves
by adopting the cultural traits of a better-off subgroup to send signals of their higher productivity
to employers. We also show how an elite subgroup may grow autonomously out of the stereotyped
population, when the most talented members adopt the cultural indices that are not affordable
to other members of the population. Those cultural traits or indices are not necessarily relevant
for productivity, but should be observable so that they can supplement the imperfect information
about the workers’ true productivity, as discussed in Fang (2001). We plan to merge this develop-
ment with our previous work in Kim and Loury (2008) in the future.
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utation, Statistical Discrimination.
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1 Introduction
We develop an identity switching model that can explain social activities such as passing and selective
out-migration among a stereotyped group, loosening the assumption of group identity immutability
made in Kim and Loury (2008). The more talented members of the group, who gain more by separating
themselves from the masses, have a greater incentive to pass for the group with the higher reputation
(incurring some cost of switching). They also differentiate themselves by adopting the cultural traits
of a better-off subgroup in order to send signals of their higher productivity to employers. Also,
we show the dynamic process by which elite subgroups emerge out of disadvantaged populations by
adopting unique cultural instruments, as discussed in Fang (2001). The most talented members of the
stereotyped population have an incentive to develop distinguished cultural indices for differentiation,
which are not affordable to other members of the group. As the most talented adopt these indices, an
elite “cultural” subgroup grows autonomously, whose members are preferentially treated by employers.
This paper is closely related to statistical discrimination literature. If a worker’s true productivity
is not perfectly observable, employers have an incentive to use the collective reputation of the job
applicants in the screening process. The individuals who belong to a group with a better collective
reputation have a greater incentive to invest in skills because the return for skill investment tends
to be greater for them, (and vice versa). With their greater (smaller) skill investment rate, the
group maintains a better (worse) collective reputation. Therefore, there are multiple self-confirming
equilibria of group reputation (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993). In Kim and Loury (2008),
we discuss this externality of group reputation and the stability of multiple equilibria in a dynamic
setting. We identify the balanced dynamic paths to the high and low stable reputation equilibria.
When the initial reputation of a group is outside the optimistic (pessimistic) path to the high (low)
stable reputation equilibrium, the group’s reputation deteriorates (improves) over time and ends up
in the lower (higher) stable equilibrium. We explain the concept of a reputation trap: if a group’s
reputation is trapped, the group cannot escape the low skill investment activities without any external
interventions such as preferential employers’ treatment and/or affirmative action, and offspring of the
group consistently suffer from the developed negative stereotype of their ancestors.
In our previous work, there are no implications for multiple social group societies, (except for the
policy implication for quota ratio or training subsidy transfer.) An inborn group identity is immutable
and each group member is affected only by the collective reputation of his own group. However, when
we loosen the immutability assumption, we can explain the relationship between group reputation
externality and identity switching between social groups, and the development of an elite group out
of a stereotyped population.
2
The first type of identity switching is “passing.” Consider a group in the reputation trap. The
talented young members in the group may consider passing for the group with the better collective
reputation when the return for passing (such as better treatment in the labor market) outweighs
the cost of passing, such as the disconnection from their own ties. A representative historical case
is the story of Korean descendants in Japan, who constitute around one percent of the Japanese
population. Most of them are the descendants of forced laborers in mines and factories who were
brought back by Japan from the peninsula during the period of Japanese imperialism. Their living
conditions in Japan were much worse than for Japanese natives, even after the end of World War II. In
order to escape negative stereotypes and prejudices, many Korean descendants have passed for native
Japanese, changing both surnames and given names at the age when they seek formal employment
and marriage. Every year about 10,000 Koreans, out of around 600,000 Korean descendants holding
Korean nationality, choose to be naturalized as “official” Japanese, giving up their names and original
nationality. Many of the naturalized Koreans conceal their Korean ethnicity, pretending that they
have no knowledge about Korean culture and language in order to prevent discrimination in the labor
or marriage market (Fukuoka et al., 1998).
Other than the case of Korean descendants in Japan, who share a similar appearance with the
Japanese, passing is harder for blacks in the United States who were brought to the country as slaves
hundreds of years ago, due to their immutable physical marker. However, a meaningful number of
the black population consistently passes for White or other races according to the NLS79 National
Longitudinal Survey conducted by the Department of Labor of the US. The survey shows that 1.87
percent of those who had originally answered “Black” in 1979 (when they were 14 to 22 years old),
switched to answering the interviewer’s race question with either “White,” “I don’t know,” or “other,”
before 1998 (Sweet, 2004).
The second type of identity switching is “partial passing” or differentiation from others. The term
“partial passing” was used first in Loury (2002) to describe the social identity manipulation used
by racially marked people to inhibit being stereotyped. When “total passing” for a member of the
advantaged group with high reputation is not available due to immutability, the most talented of the
stereotyped group are more likely to seek styles of self-presentation that aim to communicate “I’m not
one of THEM; I’m one of YOU!” because they are the ones who gain most by separating themselves
from the masses (Loury, 2002). That is, they “pass for” the slightly better-off subgroup that maintains
a higher reputation than the stereotyped population by adopting the cultural traits of the better-off
subgroup. Methods that are known to be used for partial passing among the black population in
the US are: affectations of speech, dressing up rather than wearing casual clothes, spending more on
3
conspicuous consumption and so on. For example, blacks earning higher incomes who live in an area
where the community income is relatively lower spend more on visible goods to signal their income
level and social status, while blacks who live with aﬄuent peers have less need to signal high status
(Charles et al., 2007). Also, there is evidence that the more educated (or talented) blacks tend to
speak Standard American English rather than African American English (Grogger, 2008).
This selective out-migration to the better-off subgroup may undermine solidarity in the disadvan-
taged population and cause conflicts among them, such as the accusation of “Acting White” against
the ones who practice the partial passing methods (Fryer and Torelli, 2006). The collective reputation
of the group with the selective out-migration of the most talented may become worse over time. It
would be harder for the stereotyped group to move out of the reputation trap even when an external
intervention is made. However, there might be a social gain through this practice. Among many sub-
groups with the unique cultural traits of the stereotyped population, at least some subgroups would
be able to recover their reputation when the talented young members gather around the cultural sub-
groups. The usage of the observable cultural traits in the screening process can cure to some extent
the social inefficiency of the reputation trap, which is caused by imperfect information about the true
characteristics of workers.
Also, using the dynamic model developed in this paper, we can explain the emergence of an elite
social group out of a stereotyped population. The most talented members of a stereotyped population
have an incentive to create a small group with observable distinguished cultural traits so that they
can differentiate themselves from the rest in the labor market. The usage of a cultural instrument
that is intrinsically irrelevant for productivity to form an elite group is well discussed in Fang (2001)
as an explanation for the complexity of elite etiquettes in European (or Confucian) societies and the
respect for “Oxford Accent.” Skilled and unskilled workers have different incentives to join a group
with unique cultural traits that are “expensive” to obtain. Thus, the small group is preferentially
treated by employers due to the higher fraction of the skilled workers, even though the cultural traits
of the group are not relevant for productivity. Understanding this mechanism, the talented members
of the stereotyped population may develop indices for differentiation, which are not affordable to
other members of the group. The indices may include the migration of the most talented to aﬄuent
residential areas, spending on luxury goods and designer clothing, showing interest in fine arts, and
sending children to a private boarding school. Even when there is no a priori difference in cultural
traits among the stereotyped population, we may see an autonomously growing elite subgroup with
differentiated cultural traits whose members are preferentially treated by employers and considered as
distinguished from their peers.
4
The dynamic model of endogenous group formation in this paper starts with the following basic
structure. First, the model is developed based on a dynamic group reputation model in Kim and Loury
(2008), using the same notations in the work. We have two identity groups, group A and group B.
The groups are identified by cultural traits (and also by physical marker.) Cultural traits may include
speaking standard vs. speaking slang, non-smoker vs. smoker, straight sexually vs. gay, fashionable
vs. unfashionable, learning etiquette vs. ignoring etiquette, and living in the suburbs vs. living in the
inner city. We assume that a worker’s preference for those traits is irrelevant to his investment cost
for skills: the preference distribution is not correlated with the investment cost distribution among a
population. Also, we assume that cultural traits, which are observable by employers, are not associated
with productivity, as assumed in Fang (2001). Apart from the immutable group identity, which we
have assumed in Kim and Loury (2008), this “cultural” group identity is not determined by nature.
Newborn individuals can choose which group they belong to at an early stage of their life. Newborns
who “switch” from an inborn identity type to another must incur some cost of switching, which varies
across individuals.
This paper is organized into the following sections: Section 2 describes the basic framework of the
model; Section 3 examines the dynamic system with no switches and that with switches between two
groups, after identifying potential switchers among the population; Section 4 provides an analysis of
endogenous group formation including passing, partial passing and the emergence of elite subgroup;
and Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2 Framework
In this section, we explain employers’ decision making process under the imperfect information about
the workers’ true productivity, together with workers’ decision making process for the skill acquisition
and the group identity.
2.1 Employers’ Decision
Employers are unable to observe whether a worker is qualified for a task, which is a more demanding
and rewarding assignment than other tasks. Employers observe each worker’s group identity and a
noisy signal θ ∈ [0, θ¯]. The distribution of θ depends on whether or not a worker is qualified. The
signal might be the result of a test, an interview, or some form of on-the-job training. The signal is
uniformly distributed for an unqualified worker in [0, θu], and for a qualified worker in [θq, θ¯], with
θq < θu.
In this case, employers will set the hiring standard as either θq or θu. If the signal is below θq, the
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worker must be unqualified, and, if the signal is above θu, the worker must be qualified. If the signal
is between θq and θu, the signal is unable to tell the true characteristic of the worker. Let us denote
the probability that, if a worker does invest in skills, his test outcome proves that his is qualified by
Pq(= θ¯−θuθ¯−θq ) and the probability that, if a worker does not invest in skills, his test outcome proves that
he is unqualified by Pu(=
θq
θu
).
Assumption 1 (Imperfect Information). A qualified worker’s signal is less informative, compared to
an unqualified worker’s signal. This is, the payoff uncertainty is greater for qualified workers compared
to for unqualified workers: Pq < Pu, and equivalently, θq + θu > θ¯.
The assumption implies that it is relatively harder to confirm qualification for skilled workers, while
it is relatively easier to confirm disqualification for unskilled workers. Employers should make a decision
to give the benefit of doubt (BOD) if the signal is unclear. If they give BOD to a group, the hiring
standard for the group is θu, but, if not, the hiring standard for the group is θq. Employers’ decision to
give BOD is determined by the sign of expected payoff, xq ·Prob[qualified|θ]−xu ·Prob[unqualified|θ],
for θq < θ < θu. Using Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability that the worker with group identity
i and an unclear signal (θq < θ < θu) is qualified is
Πi(1−Pq)
Πi(1−Pq)+(1−Πi)(1−Pu) . Thus, we can find the
threshold level Π∗, above which employers give BOD and below which they do not give BOD, where
Π∗ ≡ 1−Puρ(1−Pq)+1−Pu with ρ =
xq
xu
.
Lemma 1. Let us denote ξit as the indicator of employers’ giving BOD to the identity group i at time
t:
ξit =

0, ∀ Πit ∈ [0,Π∗)
1, ∀ Πit ∈ [Π∗, 1].
(1)
2.2 Workers’ Decision
There are two types of identity groups, A and B. Each individual is born a type A or a type B.
Let us denote the population size of the type-A born individuals by La and that of the type-B born
individuals by Lb. Both La and Lb are constant over time and the total population is La +Lb. Every
unit period, λ faction of the total population randomly die and the same fraction are newly born.
Thus, λLa (λLb) is the size of type-A (type-B) newborns in a unit period.
A newborn can change his inborn identity with incurring some cost k at an early stage of his life.
At the same time, he can choose whether to be qualified or not. In order to be qualified, he must
incur some cost c. The c and k are nonnegative and distributed with CDF G(c) and H(k) among the
newborns, and the two distributions are independent of each other, which means the switching cost
is not relevant to the skill investment cost.
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Each newborn will choose both identity and qualification at an early stage of his life. Let us denote
the lifetime benefits of each choice by W ie , where i ∈ {a, b} and e ∈ {q, u}. Let us denote the return
to skill investment (W iq -W
i
u) given the chosen identity i by R
i, and the return to identity switch from
i to −i (W−ie -W ie) given the chosen qualification e by Y ie : Ri ≡ W iq −W iu and Y ie ≡ W−ie −W ie . Note
that R−i −Ri ≡ Y iq − Y iu.
Let us denote vit as the “normalized” lifetime BOD expected to be given to a group i member from
time t to infinity:
vit = (δ + λ)
∫ ∞
t
ξiτ · e−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ. (2)
Note that vit = 1 when ξ
i
τ = 1, ∀τ ∈ [t,∞]. (Let v−it denote the normalized lifetime BOD expected to
be given to the members of the other group.) By virtue of normalization, the evolution rule of vit is
simplified with
v˙it = (δ + λ)[v
i
t − ξit]. (3)
Using the notation of vit, the lifetime benefits of each choice (i, e), W
i
e , is expressed as
W iq =
∫∞
t {wξiτ + wPq(1− ξiτ )} · e−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ = wPqδ+λ + w(1−Pq)δ+λ · vit
W iu =
∫∞
t w(1− Pu)ξiτ · e−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ = w(1−Pu)δ+λ · vit.
(4)
Thus, Rit and Y
i
e,t evaluated by the time t newborn are
Rit =
wPq
δ + λ
+
w(Pu − Pq)
δ + λ
· vit (5)
Y ie,t =
w(1− Pe)
δ + λ
· (v−it − vit). (6)
Consider a type-i born individual with the cost set (c, k). The net payoff for each choice (i∗, e∗)
denoted by N i
∗
e∗ , given {i, c, k}, is
Net Payoff for Choice (i∗, e∗)i,c,k

N iu =W
i
u
N iq =W
i
q − c
N−iu =W−iu − k
N−iq =W−iq − c− k
(7)
Comparing the net payoff (N i
∗
e∗) for each choice (i
∗, e∗), we can determine the best response, (i∗, e∗)i,c,k,
for type i newborns with the cost levels of c and k.
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Lemma 2. When v−i > vi, the identity and skill decision for a type-i newborn with the cost set (c, k)
is
(i∗, e∗)i,c,k =

(i, u) if c > Ri, k > Y iu and k + c > R
−i + Y iu
(i, q) if c < Ri and k > Y iq
(−i, u) if c > R−i and k < Y iu
(−i, q) if c < R−i, k < Y iq and k + c < R−i + Y iu,
(8)
and, when v−i ≤ vi, no type-i newborn switches his inborn type: (i∗, e∗)i,c,k = (i, u), ∀c ∈ (0, Ri), and
(i∗, e∗)i,c,k = (i, q), ∀c ∈ (Ri,∞).
Proof. When v−i > vi, we know that R−i > Ri and Y iq > Y iu, as described in Panel A of Fig-
ure 1. The result is confirmed when comparing N i
∗
e∗ for each range of (c, k). For example, N
i
q >
max{N iu, N−iq , N−iu } if c < Ri and k > Y iq . When v−i ≤ vi, we know that Y iq ≤ Y iu ≤ 0. Thus,
no type-i newborn has a willingness to pay k to switch his inborn type. His choice of qualification
depends on Ri. ¥
The lemma is described in Panel A of Figure 1 for the case of v−i > vi. The lemma directly proves
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the more talented the newborn, the more likely that he will
switch from his inborn identity type to the other identity type.
The more talented, the more likely that he will invest in skills. The less talented, the more likely
that he will not invest in skills. The return to identity switch for a qualified worker is greater than
that for an unqualified worker under Assumption 1: Y iq > Y
i
e given v
−i > vi. (This is because that
the payoff uncertainty is greater for qualified workers than unqualified workers: 1− Pq > 1− Pu. The
switch to the group with the better collective reputation can reduce the uncertainty.) Thus, the more
talented, the more likely that he will switch to the other type whose members will receive the better
treatment by employers.
3 Dynamic Systems
For the purpose of the dynamic analysis, we will simplify both G(c) and H(k). Each cohort of
either group is composed of Πl fraction of low investment cost newborns, Πh −Πl fraction of medium
investment cost newborns and 1−Πh fraction of high investment cost newborns. Denoting those cost
levels by cl, cm and ch, they satisfy the following condition:
Assumption 2. cl <
wPq
δ+λ < cm <
wPu
δ+λ < ch.
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With this assumption, we ensure that cl is small enough that the Πl faction of low cost newborns
always invest in skills, and ch is big enough that the 1−Πh fraction of high cost newborns never invest
in skills, regardless of Ri,R−iand Y ie . Also, each cohort of either group is composed of η fraction of
high switching cost newborns and 1− η fraction of low switching cost newborns. Denoting those cost
levels by kh and kl, they satisfy the following condition:
Assumption 3. wδ+λ − cm < kl < w(1−Pq)δ+λ < kh.
With this assumption, we ensure that kh is big enough that the η fraction of high switching cost
never switch their inborn identity types, regardless of their investment cost c. Also, kl is big enough
that the newborns with an investment cost of either cm or ch never switch their inborn identity types.
However, any newborn with the low investment cost cl and the low switching cost kl will switch his
identity type and join the other group as long as the return for the identity switch (Y iq ) is greater
than the switching cost kl. The population distribution that satisfies the two assumptions is depicted
in Panel B of Figure 1.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the newborns with investment cost cl always invest in skills
and the newborns with investment cost ch never invest in skills. The newborns with switching cost kh
never switch their inborn types. The newborns with investment cost either cm or ch never switch their
inborn identity types.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
The above lemma implies:
Proposition 2 (Potential Switcher). Under Assumptions 2 and 3, newborns with the cost set (cl, kl)
are the only potential switchers from their inborn identity types to the other type. Type i born potential
switchers switch if and only if Y iq is greater than kl.
Proof. Lemma 3 implies that newborns with the cost set (cl, kl) are the only potential switchers. Also,
they will invest in skills whether or not they switch to the other type according to the lemma. Since
Y iq is the extra benefits of switching for the newborns who will invest in skills (W
−i
q −W iq), they switch
if Y iq > kl. Otherwise, the switching cost is greater than (or equal to) the benefits of the switching for
the potential switchers. Thus, they do not switch. ¥
3.1 Dynamics with Identity Switches Restricted
Before moving to the identity switch dynamics, let us analyze the simplest situation in which no
newborn switches his inborn group identity. We can do this by simply imposing a condition that
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identity switch is prohibited by an authority, or the fraction of newborns with the highest switching
cost kh is one (η = 1). Each variable in this section is expressed with the superscript “n”, symbolizing
the condition of identity switch restriction. By equations (3) and (5), we can describe how Rnt evolves
over time:
R˙nt =
w(Pu − Pq)
δ + λ
v˙nt
= w(Pu − Pq)(vnt − ξnt )
= (δ + λ)
[
Rnt −
wPq
δ + λ
− w(Pu − Pq)
δ + λ
ξnt
]
. (9)
Let φnt denote the fraction of time t born workers who invest and become qualified:
φnt =

0, ∀Rnt ∈ [0, cl)
Πl, ∀Rnt ∈ [cl, cm)
Πh, ∀Rnt ∈ [cm, ch)
1, ∀Rnt ∈ [ch, 1].
(10)
Since λ fraction of the total population is replaced with newborns in a unit period, Πnt evolves in short
time interval ∆t in the following way.
Πnt+∆t ≈ λ∆t ·
(
φnt + φ
n
t+∆t
2
)
+ (1− λ∆t) ·Πnt . (11)
By the rearrangement of the equation, we have
∆Πnt
∆t
≡ Π
n
t+∆t −Πnt
∆t
≈ λ
[
φnt + φ
n
t+∆t
2
−Πnt
]
.
Taking ∆t→ 0, we can express how Πnt evolves over time:
Π˙nt = λ[φ
n
t −Πnt ]. (12)
Therefore, the dynamic system is summarized with
R˙nt = (δ + λ)
[
Rnt −
wPq
δ + λ
− w(Pu − Pq)
δ + λ
ξnt
]
Π˙nt = λ[φ
n
t −Πnt ], (13)
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in which ξnt is a function of Π
n
t and φ
n
t is a function of R
n
t , according to equations (1) and (10).
Panel A of Figure 2 describes the dynamic paths toward the two stable equilibria, Ql
(
wPq
δ+λ ,Πl
)
and
Qh
(
wPu
δ+λ ,Πh
)
. Knowing that Rnt is a linear function of v
n
t in equation (5), we have
φnt =

Πl, ∀vnt ∈ [0, v∗)
Πh, ∀vnt ∈ [v∗, 1],
with v∗ ≡ (δ + λ)cm − wPq
w(Pu − Pq) . (14)
The usage of vnt , instead of R
n
t , can further simplify the dynamic system.
Proposition 3. The dynamic system with a flow variable Πnt and a jumping variable v
n
t is
v˙nt = (δ + λ)[v
n
t − ξnt ]
Π˙nt = λ[φ
n
t −Πnt ],
with demarcation loci of
v˙t
n = 0 Locus : vnt = ξ
n
t
Π˙nt = 0 Locus : Π
n
t = φ
n
t .
Panel B of Figure 2 describes the dynamic paths to two stable equilibria, Qnl (0,Πl) and Q
n
h (1,Πh).
Let us denote pio as the level of reputation at vn = v∗ with which the group at the state (v∗, pio) can
directly reach the upper equilibria Qnh along the optimistic path. Also, denote pi
p as the level of
reputation at vn = v∗ with which the group at the state (v∗, pip) can directly reach the lower equilibria
Qnl along the pessimistic path. Using the differential equations in Proposition 3, we can find
pio = Πh + (Π∗ −Πh)v∗−
λ
δ+λ , (15)
pip = Πl + (Π∗ −Πl)(1− v∗)−
λ
δ+λ . (16)
In this paper, we assume that δ is big enough that two economically stable states are “separate” from
each other. (Refer to Lemma 3 in Kim and Loury (2008) for the definition of separation.) With the
separated two equilibria, a group in the lower equilibrium Qnl is in a reputation trap, which means
the group cannot escape the status of low skill investment activities, owing to the negative influence
of the group’s bad reputation. A group in the upper equilibrium Qnh enjoys the secured BODs given
by employers and maintains the high skill investment activities, owing to the positive influence of
the group’s good reputation. If the two equilibria are separated, the size of overlap Ln is simply the
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difference between pip and pio:
Ln = Πl −Πh + (Π∗ −Πl)(1− v∗)−
λ
δ+λ + (Πh −Π∗)v∗−
λ
δ+λ . (17)
Inside the overlap, the expectation about the future determines the final state, either Qnl or Q
n
h.
Outside the overlap, the initial reputation is critical: if it is below the overlap, the final state should
be the lower equilibrium Qnl , and, if it is above the overlap, the final state should be the upper one
Qnh. (Kim and Loury, 2008)
3.2 Dynamics with Identity Switches from Type j to Type i
Imagine a situation that some fraction of type-j newborns switch to type i consistently since some
fixed point of time X. Until the incidence, both group sizes have been constant as Li and Lj . Under
the given assumptions, the exact (1− η)Πl fraction of type-j newborns, whose cost set is (cl, kl), will
switch their inborn identity types to type i, according to Lemma 3 and Proposition 2. Thus, the
population sizes of group i and group j eventually arrive Li + (1 − η)ΠlLj and Lj − (1 − η)ΠlLj for
each. In the following sections, we will address the dynamic system for group i which benefits from
the inflows of skilled workers from type-j newborns, and the dynamic system for group j which loses
some of the most talented newborns to group i. Let us denote the size ratio of group j and group i by
L˜i(≡ LjLi ).
3.2.1 Dynamic System of Group i with Inflows from Group j
Let us denote the size of the type-i skilled workers at time t by Zit , and the total size of the type-i
workers at time t byM it . Note thatM
i
X is Li, andM
i
t increases consistently over time with the inflows
from the type-j newborns since time X. Thus, M it changes in short time interval ∆t:
M it+∆t = (1− λ∆t)M it + Liλ∆t+ Ljλ∆t ·Π′l. (18)
Taking ∆t→ 0, we have the evolution rule of M it :
M˙ it = λ[Li + LjΠ
′
l −M it ]. (19)
Then, since M iX is Li, M
i
t can be expressed explicitly:
M it = Li + LjΠ
′
l · [1− e−λ(t−X)]. (20)
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The Zit changes in short time interval ∆t, denoting (1− η)Πl by Π′l:
Zit+∆t = (1− λ∆t)Zit + Liλ∆t ·
φit + φ
i
t+∆t
2
+ Ljλ∆t ·Π′l. (21)
Taking ∆t→ 0, we have the evolution rule of Zit :
Z˙it = λ[Liφ
i
t + LjΠ
′
l − Zit ]. (22)
As far as φit is constant over time (φ
i
t = φ¯
i), Zit can be expressed explicitly, knowing Z
i
X = Π
i
X · Li:
Zit = Liφ¯
i + LjΠ′l + [LiΠ
i
X − Liφ¯i − LjΠ′l]e−λ(t−X). (23)
Therefore, using equations (20) and (23), we can express the reputation of group i at time t:
Πit
(
=
Zit
M it
)
=
Liφ¯
i + LjΠ′l + [LiΠ
i
X − Liφ¯i − LjΠ′l]e−λ(t−X)
Li + LjΠ′l · [1− e−λ(t−X)]
. (24)
Since we already know that v˙it = (δ + λ)[v
i
t − ξit], as far as ξit is constant (ξit = ξ¯i),
vit = ξ¯
i + (viX − ξ¯i)e(δ+λ)(t−X). (25)
After the rearrangement, we have the following useful outcome:
e−λ(t−X) =
[
viX − ξ¯i
vit − ξ¯i
] λ
δ+λ
. (26)
From equations (24) and (26), we can achieve the following useful lemma:
Lemma 4. Suppose the Π′l fraction of type-j newborns consistently switch to type i since t = X. Given
constant ξ¯i and φ¯i, we can express the relationship between the initial state (viX ,Π
i
X) and the state at
time t (vit,Π
i
t): [
viX − ξ¯i
vit − ξ¯i
] λ
δ+λ
=
Liφ¯
i + LjΠ′l − (Li + LjΠ′l)Πit
−LiΠiX + Liφ¯i + LjΠ′l − LjΠ′lΠit
. (27)
Also, we can evaluate the following, using equations (18) and (21),
∆Πit
∆t
≡ Π
i
t+∆t −Πit
∆t
=
1
∆t
·
[
Zit+∆t
M it+∆t
−Πit
]
.
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Taking ∆t→ 0, we have the evolution rule of Πit:
Π˙it =
λ[(Liφit + LjΠ
′
l)− (Li + LjΠ′l)Πit]
M it
. (28)
Proposition 4. Suppose that the Π′l fraction of type-j newborns switch to type i consistently since
time X. Then, the dynamic system with a flow variable Πit and a jumping variable v
i
t is
v˙it = (δ + λ)[v
i
t − ξit]
Π˙it =
λ[(Liφit + LjΠ
′
l)− (Li + LjΠ′l)Πit]
M it
,
with demarcation loci of
v˙t
i = 0 Locus : vit = ξ
i
t
Π˙it = 0 Locus : Π
i
t =
Liφ
i
t + LjΠ
′
l
Li + LjΠ′l
.
Corollary 1. In the dynamics of group i which is growing with the inflows of the most talented type-j
newborns, the reputation of group i improves faster (or deteriorates slower) compared to that of the
no-switches dynamics: Π˙it > Π˙
n
t , ∀φit ∈ {Πl,Πh}, ∀t ∈ (X,∞), except when ΠiX = 1. (Note that when
ΠiX = 1, Π˙
i
X = Π˙
n
X .)
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
The dynamics generates two stable equilibria: Q′l(0, L
′
i) and Q
′
h(1,H
′
i), where L
′
i =
LiΠl+LjΠ
′
l
Li+LjΠ′l
and
H ′i =
LiΠh+LjΠ
′
l
Li+LjΠ′l
. Both of them are positioned higher than stable equilibria in no-switches dynamics,
Qnl (0,Πl) and Q
n
h(1,Πh). Let us denote pi
o′
i as the time-X reputation level Π
i
X at v
n = v∗ with which
group i at the time-X state (v∗, pio′i) can directly reach the upper equilibria Q
′
h along the optimistic
path. Also, denote pip′i as the level of reputation at v
n = v∗ with which group i at the time-X
state (v∗, pip′i) can directly reach the lower equilibrium Q
′
l along the pessimistic path. Using Lemma
4, we can compute both of them. For the first, apply ξ¯i = 0, φ¯i = Πh, (viX ,Π
i
X) = (v
∗, pio′i) and
(vit,Π
i
t) = (1,Π
∗):
pio′i = Πh + L˜iΠ
′
l(1−Π∗)− [L˜iΠ′l(1−Π∗) + (Πh −Π∗)] · v∗−
λ
δ+λ . (29)
For the second, apply ξ¯i = 1, φ¯i = Πl, (viX ,Π
i
X) = (v
∗, pip′) and (vit,Πit) = (0,Π∗):
pip′i = Πl + L˜iΠ
′
l(1−Π∗)− [L˜iΠ′l(1−Π∗) + (Πl −Π∗)] · (1− v∗)−
λ
δ+λ . (30)
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Comparing pio′i and pi
p′
i with pi
o and pip in equations (15) and (16), we have the following result.
Corollary 2. Both pio′i and pi
p′
i in group i dynamics with the inflows of the most talented type-
j newborns are smaller than pio and pip in the dynamics with no identity switches: pio′i < pi
o and
pip′i < pi
p.
The optimistic path from (v∗, pio′i) and the pessimistic path from (v
∗, pip′i) are described in Figure
3.
3.2.2 Dynamic System of Group j with Outflows to Group i
According to Proposition 2, outflows to group i should be among the most talented type-j newborns
with the lower switching cost kl. Note that when the potential switchers start to switch at time X,
the reputation level of group j should be lower than pio, which is the lower boundary of the optimistic
path in the no-switches dynamics: ΠjX < pi
o.
Lemma 5. When type-j potential switchers start to switch at time X, ΠjX < pi
o and, consequently,
vjX = 0.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
As the Πl(1 − η) fraction of type-j newborns switches to type i since time X, M jX = Lj and M jt
decreases over time. Then, M jt changes in the short time interval ∆t:
M jt+∆t = (1− λ∆t)M jt + Ljλ∆t[1−Π′l]. (31)
Taking ∆t→ 0, we have
M˙ jt = λ[Lj(1−Π′l)−M jt ]. (32)
Then, since M jX is Lj , M
j
t can be expressed explicitly:
M jt = Lj(1−Π′l) + LjΠ′le−λ(t−X). (33)
Also, the size of skilled workers among group j changes over time:
Zjt+∆t = (1− λ∆t)Zjt + Ljλ∆t ·Πlη. (34)
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Taking ∆t→ 0, we have the evolution rule of Zjt :
Z˙jt = λ[LjΠlη − Zjt ]. (35)
Since ZjX = Π
j
X · Lj , the Zit can be expressed explicitly:
Zjt = LjΠlη + Lj(Π
j
X −Πlη)e−λ(t−X). (36)
Thus, we can evaluate the following, using equations (34) and (31),
∆Πjt
∆t
≡ Π
j
t+∆t −Πjt
∆t
=
1
∆t
·
[
Zjt+∆t
M jt+∆t
−Πjt
]
.
Taking ∆t→ 0, we have the evolution rule of Πjt :
Π˙jt =
λLj [Πlη − (1−Π′l)Πjt ]
M jt
. (37)
Therefore, using the above lemma, we can reach the following results:
Proposition 5. Suppose that the Πl(1 − η) fraction of type-j newborns switch to type i consistently
since time X. Then, the dynamic system with a flow variable Πjt and a jumping variable v
j
t is
v˙jt = (δ + λ)[v
j
t − ξjt ]
Π˙jt =
λLj [Πlη − (1−Π′l)Πjt ]
M jt
,
in which vjt = ξ
j
t = 0, ∀t ∈ (X,∞), and Πjt approaches monotonically L′′j (≡ Πlη1−Πl(1−η)), which is
smaller than Πl.
Proof. Since pio > Πl and Πl > L′′j (≡ Πlη1−Πl(1−η)), pio > L′′j . For any Π
j
X < pi
o, Πjt approaches L
′′
j . Under
the no-switches dynamics, the reputation recovery path is not available for any initial reputation level
Πn0 ∈ (0, pio). Therefore, the reputation recovery path should not be available to group j which is
losing their most talented newborns to the other group, which implies vjt = ξ
j
t = 0, ∀t ∈ (X,∞), as
vnt = ξ
n
t = 0, ∀t, for any Πn0 ∈ (0, pio). ¥
The dynamics of group j is displayed in Figure 4. Note that whenever the most talented type-j
newborns switch to type i, group j is positioned on the pessimistic path with ξjt = 0, v
j
t = 0 and
Rjt =
wPq
δ+λ , ∀t ∈ (X,∞). The state of group j losing the most talented to group i converges to
Q′′(0, L′′j ), where L
′′
j =
Πlη
1−Πl(1−η) , which is smaller than Πl.
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Corollary 3. In the dynamics of group j which is losing some of the most talented newborns to group
i, the reputation of group j deteriorates faster (or improves slower) compared to that of the no-switches
dynamics: Π˙jt < Π˙
n
t , ∀t ∈ (X,∞).
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
4 Endogenous Group Formation
In order to analyze the endogenous process of group formation, we impose the following reasonable
assumptions about the behaviors of group members: 1) Group members can make a consensus for the
group state that will be realized in the far future, within a reasonably short period. They can agree
quickly with the path to be taken, when multiple equilibrium paths (optimistic and pessimistic) are
available. 2) Whenever multiple equilibria are possible for the future group state, group members tend
to choose the equilibrium with the higher group reputation. Whenever multiple paths are available,
the group tends to choose the (optimistic) path that leads to the higher group reputation. 3) Once
group members agree with a future group state, they behave in a way to arrive there as early as
possible. Once group members choose the path to take, they determine the level of a jumping variable
in a way that the group state reaches the equilibrium as fast as possible. 4) When two groups hold
expectations about the future that conflict with each other, they can reach “social consensus” toward
the future within a reasonably short period. For example, when it is impossible that both groups take
the optimistic path, one group gives up the option to take the optimistic path within a reasonably
short period.
We assume that the overlap in the no-switches dynamics is placed within the two stable equilibria:
Qnl and Q
n
h. Under the constraints that newborns cannot switch, any group in the lower equilibrium
Qnl is in the reputation trap, and cannot escape the low skill investment activities.
By Lemma 5, we know that vjX = 0 when the Π
′
l fraction of type-j newborns start to join group i.
Since they switch their inborn types only when Y jq,t > kl, we can find the threshold level of v
i
X :
Y jq,X =
w(1− Pq)
δ + λ
(viX − vjX) =
w(1− Pq)
δ + λ
viX > kl.
Therefore, the threshold level of viX , denoted by vˆ
i
X , is
(δ+λ)kl
w(1−Pq) , given v
j
X = 0. We impose the following
condition that is not critical in the structure of the given dynamic model, but useful to achieve the
main results more effectively:
Condition 1. The level of kl ensures vˆiX > v
∗: kl >
1−Pq
Pu−Pq
(
cm − wPqδ+λ
)
.
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It is notable that there always exists a positive range of kl that satisfies the condition and Assump-
tion 3 for any cm satisfying Assumption 2: the range of kl is
(
max
{
w
δ+λ − cm, 1−PqPu−Pq
(
cm − wPqδ+λ
)}
,
w(1−Pq)
δ+λ
)
for given cm ∈
(
wPq
δ+λ ,
wPu
δ+λ
)
. Readers may try and confirm that the following results in this paper can
be replicated for the case of vˆiX ≤ v∗: kl ≤ 1−PqPu−Pq
(
cm − wPqδ+λ
)
.
4.1 Group i Equilibrium Path with Skill Inflows from Group j
Since kl is less than
w(1−Pq)
δ+λ by Assumption 3, we know that v
∗ < vˆiX < 1 under Condition 1. Then, we
find the corresponding threshold level of group i reputation, ΠˆiX , above which the initial reputation of
group i can lead the low cost talented type-j newborns to switch to type i immediately. Using Lemma
4, ΠˆiX is computed applying ξ¯
i = 0, φ¯i = Πh, (viX ,Π
i
X) = (vˆ
i
X , Πˆ
i
X) and (v
i
t,Π
i
t) = (1,Π
∗):
ΠˆiX = Πh + L˜iΠ
′
l(1−Π∗)− [L˜iΠ′l(1−Π∗) + (Πh −Π∗)] · vˆiX−
λ
δ+λ . (38)
However, if group i members can expect the inflows of the talented type-j newborns in the future,
they may increase their skill investment rate much earlier even before the incidence of the skill inflows,
as described in Panel A of Figure 5. Before the incidence of the skill inflows, the evolution rules for
Πit and v
i
t should follow the rules in the no-switches dynamics summarized in Proposition 3. Thus,
applying ξnt = 0, φ
n
t = Πh, (v
i
0,Π
i
0) = (v
∗, pio′′i ) and (v
i
t,Π
i
t) = (vˆ
i
X , Πˆ
i
X) to the differential equations
in the proposition, we can find the group i reputation level pio′′i at v
i = v∗ with which the group state
(vit,Π
i
t) reaches (vˆ
i
X , Πˆ
i
X) that initiates the switching of the talented type-j newborns:
pio′′i = Πh − (Πh − ΠˆiX) · [vˆiX/v∗]
λ
δ+λ . (39)
The following lemma summarizes the relative size of pioi , pi
o′
i, and pi
o′′
i .
Lemma 6. Since v∗ < vˆiX < 1, pi
o′
i < pi
o′′
i < pi
o.
Proof. Compare pio, pio′i and pi
o′′
i , using equations (15), (29) and (39) and applying equation (38):
pio′′i − pio′i = L˜iΠ′l(1−Π∗) · (vˆiX
λ
δ+λ − v∗ λδ+λ )v∗− λδ+λ > 0
pio − pio′′i = L˜iΠ′l(1−Π∗) · (1− vˆiX
λ
δ+λ )v∗−
λ
δ+λ > 0. (40)
¥
If pio′′i is below Πl, the optimistic path that can reach (vˆ
i
X , Πˆ
i
X) is extended further up to the
Πi = 0 horizontal line and, thus, the group i even with zero reputation can take the optimistic path to
Q′h(1,H
′
i), as described in Panel B of Figure 5. Therefore, we can find the effective threshold of group
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i reputation Π˜i, above which the optimistic path to the higher equilibrium Q′h(1,H
′
i) is available to
group i members.
Proposition 6. Given vjX = 0, the effective threshold of group i reputation Π˜
i is as follows, above
which group i can move out of the reputation trap and reach the high reputation equilibrium Q′h(1, H
′
i):
Π˜i =

Πh − (Πh − ΠˆiX) · [vˆiX/v∗]
λ
δ+λ (= pio′′i ) if pi
o′′
i ≥ Πl,
0 if pio′′i < Πl.
(41)
The following corollary shows the important role of relative size between two groups in the deter-
mination of the effective reputation threshold for group i (Π˜i):
Corollary 4. There exists the threshold L˜∗i of L˜i in (0,∞), above which Π˜i = 0 and below which
Π˜i = pio′′i :
L˜∗i =
Π′l(1−Π∗) · (1− vˆiX
λ
δ+λ )v∗−
λ
δ+λ
Πh −Πl + (Π∗ −Πh)v∗−
λ
δ+λ
. (42)
Proof. Using equations (38) and (39), we can get L˜∗i that satisfies pi
o′′
i = Πl. L˜
∗
i is positive because
the denominator is positive: Πh −Πl + (Π∗ −Πh)v∗−
λ
δ+λ = pio −Πl > 0.¥
4.2 Search For Final State Given Initial State (Πb0,Π
a
0)
Now let us get return to the original question, the dynamics of groups A and B. Using the findings in
the previous sections, we can search for the final state for each initial state (Πb0,Π
a
0) under the imposed
assumptions and a condition.
First, check the state evolution under the constraints that type-B newborns can switch to the
other type but the switches of type-A newborns to type B are not permitted. In this case, only type-B
potential switchers with the cost set (cl, kl) may consider switching (Proposition 2). By Lemma 5,
there is no switching of type-B newborns when Πb0 ≥ pio. When Πb0 < pio, vbt = 0,∀t, whether or not
the type-B potential switchers switch, according to the dynamics summarized in Propositions 3 and 5.
According to Proposition 6, since vbX = 0 with Π
b
0 < pi
o given, group A with its initial reputation above
Π˜a can reach the high reputation equilibrium Q′h. Below Π˜
a, the group’s reputation ends up with Πl.
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Therefore, we can summarize the basin of attraction for each potential attractor in the following way:
Basins of Attraction I

{(Πb0,Πa0)|pio ≤ Πb0 ≤ 1, pio ≤ Πa0 ≤ 1} for attractor (Πh,Πh),
{(Πb0,Πa0)|pio ≤ Πb0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Πa0 < pio} for attractor (Πh,Πl),
{(Πb0,Πa0)|0 ≤ Πb0 < pio, Π˜a ≤ Πa0 ≤ 1} for attractor (L′′b ,H ′a),
{(Πb0,Πa0)|0 ≤ Πb0 < pio, 0 ≤ Πa0 < Π˜a} for attractor (Πl,Πl).
(43)
These basins of attractions are displayed in Panel A of Figure 6 for the case of Π˜a = pio′′a (that is,
pio′′a > Πl). Any initial position in the basin of attraction for the attractor (L′′b ,H
′
a) that is colored
in yellow in the panel will lead the type-B potential switchers to start to join group A at time X in
order to obtain the benefits of superior collective reputation of group A in the labor market. Note
that, given 0 ≤ Πb0 < pio, the type-B potential switchers immediately start to switch when the initial
reputation Πa0 is greater than Πˆ
a
X ; If Π
a
0 is smaller than Πˆ
a
X , though Π
a
0 is greater than Π˜
a, the type-B
potential switchers do not switch right away, but wait until the group A’s reputation Πat improves up
to ΠˆaX .
Second, check the state evolution under the constraints that type-A newborns can switch to the
other type but the switching of type-B newborns to type A are not permitted. In this case, only
type-A potential switchers with the cost set (cl, kl) may consider switching (Proposition 2). With the
same logic above, we can summarize the basin of attraction for each potential attractor:
Basins of Attraction II

{(Πb0,Πa0)|pio ≤ Πa0 ≤ 1, pio ≤ Πb0 ≤ 1} for attractor (Πh,Πh),
{(Πb0,Πa0)|pio ≤ Πa0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Πb0 < pio} for attractor (Πl,Πh),
{(Πb0,Πa0)|0 ≤ Πa0 < pio, Π˜b ≤ Πb0 ≤ 1} for attractor (H ′b, L′′a),
{(Πb0,Πa0)|0 ≤ Πa0 < pio, 0 ≤ Πb0 < Π˜b} for attractor (Πl,Πl).
(44)
These basins of attractions are displayed in Panel B of Figure 6 for the case of Π˜b = pio′′b (that is,
pio′′b > Πl). Any initial position in the basin of attraction for the attractor (H
′
b, L
′′
a) that is colored
in orange in the panel will lead the type-A potential switchers to start joining group B at time X.
Note that, given 0 ≤ Πa0 < pio, the type-A potential switchers immediately start to switch when Πb0 is
greater than ΠˆbX . Otherwise, they do not switch until group B’s reputation Π
b
t improves further up to
ΠˆbX . From Basins of Attraction I and II summarized above, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 (Basin of Attraction with Switching). For any type i ∈ {A,B}, the following is true:
under the constraints that only type i newborns can switch and the type -i newborns are restricted not
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to switch, any initial position in {(Πi0,Π−i0 )|0 ≤ Πi0 < pio, Π˜−i ≤ Π−i0 ≤ 1} will lead the low-cost type
i potential switchers to start to join group −i at some point of time X. An initial position in other
areas never initiate the switching of the type i potential switchers in the future.
By lifting both constraints above, we can obtain the full dynamic picture: the overlap of Panel A
and Panel B of Figure 6 generates Panel A of Figure 7 (for the case that Π˜a = pio′′a and Π˜b = pio′′b ). First,
when both Πa0 and Π
b
0 are greater than pi
o, no potential switcher considers the switching (Lemma 5),
and the state (Πat ,Π
b
t) approaches the high reputation symmetric equilibrium (Πh,Πh). Also when Π
a
0
and Πb0 are smaller than Π˜
a and Π˜b for each, no potential switcher considers switching (Proposition
6), and the state (Πat ,Π
b
t) approaches the low reputation symmetric equilibrium (Πl,Πl). For the
other initial positions, (Πb0,Π
a
0) belongs to either the basin of attraction for (L
′′
b ,H
′
a), which is the
area satisfying Πb0 < pi
o and Πa0 ≥ Π˜a or the basin of attraction for (H ′b, L′′a), which is the area
satisfying Πa0 < pi
o and Πb0 ≥ Π˜b, or to both areas. For the former case, type B potential switchers
consistently join group A from the time X and the state (Πbt ,Π
a
t ) approaches (L
′′
b ,H
′
a). For the latter
case, type A potential switchers consistently join group B from the time X and the state (Πbt ,Π
a
t )
approaches (H ′b, L
′′
a). The basin of attraction for (L
′′
b ,H
′
a) and that for (H
′
b, L
′′
a) are overlapped in the
area: X ≡ {Π˜b ≤ Πb0 < pio and Π˜a ≤ Πa0 < pio}, in which both type-A potential switchers and type-B
potential switchers have an incentive to switch to the other type as long as the potential switchers of
the other type do not switch. Therefore, in this case, the social consensus about the future among
the whole population may determine the future state: if people believe that group A will grow as an
elite group with a higher reputation, only type-B potential switchers may switch to the other type
and, consequently, the future state approaches (L′′b ,H
′
a). If people believe that group B will grow as
an elite group with a higher reputation, only type-A potential switchers may switch to the other type
and, consequently, the future state approaches (H ′b, L
′′
a).
Lemma 8 (Overlap of Basins of Attraction). In an overlapped area of the basin of attraction for
(L′′b ,H
′
a) and that for (H
′
b, L
′′
a), the expectation about the future among the whole population determines
the final state. In the areas other than the overlap, the initial state (Πb0,Π
a
0) decisively determines the
final state.
Example 1 (Expectation - Point A in Figure 7). In a point A, in which the initial statuses of two
groups are identical in terms of the group size and the group reputation, the difference between two
groups’ reputations grows over time as the potential switchers of one group consistently migrate to the
other group. The expectation (social consensus) about the future determines which group grows as an
elite group and which one keeps on losing its reputation.
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Using Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, we can summarize the future state for each initial state (Πb0,Π
a
0)
in the following way:
Theorem 1. For given initial state (Πb0,Π
a
0), the final state limt→∞(Πbt ,Πat ) is
lim
t→∞(Π
b
t ,Π
a
t ) =

(Πh,Πh) if (Πb0,Π
a
0) ∈ {pio ≤ Πb0 ≤ 1, pio ≤ Πa0 ≤ 1}
(Πl,Πl) if (Πb0,Π
a
0) ∈ {0 ≤ Πa0 < Π˜a, 0 ≤ Πb0 < Π˜b}
(L′′b , H
′
a) if (Π
b
0,Π
a
0) ∈ {0 ≤ Πb0 < pio, Π˜a ≤ Πa0 ≤ 1} −X
(H ′b, L
′′
a) if (Π
b
0,Π
a
0) ∈ {0 ≤ Πa0 < pio, Π˜b ≤ Πb0 ≤ 1} −X
(L′′b , H
′
a) or (H
′
b, L
′′
a) if (Π
b
0,Π
a
0) ∈ X,
(45)
in which X ≡ {Π˜b ≤ Πb0 < pio and Π˜a ≤ Πa0 < pio}, L′′a = L′′b = Πlη1−Πl(1−η) , H ′a =
LaΠh+LbΠ
′
l
La+LbΠ
′
l
and
H ′b =
LbΠh+LaΠ
′
l
Lb+LaΠ
′
l
.
First, note that both (Πl,Πh) and (Πh,Πl) are not stable. The newborn potential switchers in a
disadvantaged group may switch their inborn types (thus incurring the cost of switching) and try to
join the advantaged group to take the benefits of their superior reputation, which is often called a
“passing” behavior.
Corollary 5 (Instability of (Πl,Πh) and (Πh,Πl)). Both (Πl,Πh) and (Πh,Πl), which are stable in a
no-switches dynamics (Proposition 3), are not stable in a dynamic system with switches allowed.
Example 2 (“Passing” - Points B or B′ in Figure 7). Given the initial points B(Πl,Πh) or B′(Πh,Πl)
in Figure 7, the talented newborns with the lower switching cost among a stereotyped disadvantaged
population consistently pass for the advantaged group. Consequently, the reputation of the disadvan-
taged group becomes even worse and that of the advantaged group becomes even better.
The above theorem implies the followings: 1) when both groups’ reputations are good enough
(Πb0 > pi
o,Πa0 > pi
o), the two groups’ reputations tend to converge to the high reputation level Πh;
2) when both are very bad (Πb0 < Π˜
b,Πa0 < Π˜
a), they tend to converge to the low reputation level
Πl; and 3) otherwise, the little better-off group’s reputation tends to improve over time and approach
a reputation even higher than Πh, while the little worse-off group’s reputation tends to deteriorate
over time to a reputation level even worse than Πl, as the potential switchers of the worse-off group
consistently differentiate themselves from their own group and join the little better-off group that is
expected to grow as an elite group. Let us define this behavior as “partial passing” (Loury 2002).
Those who commit partial passing might be blamed by their peer members for the differentiation from
them, which is often convicted as “Action White.”
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Corollary 6 (Divergence among Disadvantaged Population). Unless the reputations of two disadvan-
taged groups (Πb0 < pi
o,Πa0 < pi
o) are very bad (Πb0 < Π˜
b,Πa0 < Π˜
a), the reputations of the two groups
tend to diverge over time, as the potential switchers of the little worse-off group consistently migrate
to the little better-off group.
Example 3 (“Partial Passing” - Points C or C ′ in Figure 7). Consider two subgroups with distinguished
cultural traits of the stereotyped population. Assume a small difference in their initial reputations. The
talented newborns of the worse-off subgroup have an incentive to differentiate themselves from the other
members of the group and join the better-off subgroup, by collectively adopting the cultural traits of
the better-off subgroup. Owing to the “partial passing” activities of the talented young members of the
worse-off subgroup, the reputation of the slightly better-off subgroup may improve significantly over
time, as the percentage of the qualified workers among them grows continuously. This partial passing
or differentiation activities can help the talented young members in the stereotyped population to be
less influenced by the negative stereotype in the labor market.
Now, let us consider two disadvantaged groups with the different group sizes. When group sizes
are different, the low cost talented newborns of the bigger group have greater incentive to switch to
the smaller group than the other way around, because the talented newborns’ switching of the bigger
group can make a significant improvement in the reputation of the smaller group, but the newborns’
switching of the smaller group to the bigger group would not make enough difference. Thus, with the
others being equal, the smaller group is more likely than the bigger group to become an “elite” group.
Panel B of Figure 7 displays this tendency: pio′′b > pi
o′′
a when La < Lb.
Corollary 7 (Selective Out-Migration from Bigger Group to Smaller Group). Among the two disad-
vantaged groups A and B (Πb0 < pi
o,Πa0 < pi
o), the smaller group is more likely to grow as an “elite”
group and the bigger one is more likely to remain as a disadvantaged group in the reputation trap.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
Example 4 (Separating from Masses - Point D in Figure 7). Consider two subgroups A and B in the
stereotyped population, with the different group sizes (La < Lb), which means the cultural traits of B-
type are more popular a priori than those of A-type. The talented newborns of the majority subgroup
B, who suffer from the group’s negative stereotype in the market, may seek a way to differentiate
themselves from the masses. One way to do this is to collectively join the less popular cultural group
A while incurring the costs of adopting the new cultural traits. Even when the initial reputation of the
minority cultural group A is worse than that of the majority group B as noted in Point D in Figure 7
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(Πa0 < Π
b
0), the selective out-migration of the most talented of the larger group B to the smaller group
A can improve the smaller group A’s reputation fast, and thus the talented newborns of group B can
escape the reputation handicap in the labor market.
The feasibility of identity-switching is represented by the parameter η: the greater η is, the more
newborns never consider switching due to the very high switching cost. Also, the feasibility is rep-
resented by the parameter kl: the greater kl is, the less affordable the switching is for the newborns
who may consider switching.
Corollary 8 (Switching Feasibility). The less feasible the switching is, the less likely the divergence
of group reputations arises.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
If the social identity manipulation such as partial passing is not available, any subgroup in the
stereotyped population may not recover its reputation, moving out of the reputation trap. The usage
of the identity manipulation can help some disadvantaged subgroups to build up their reputations
with the inflows of the most talented from other subgroups, and with their greater skill investment
activities. In this sense, the identity manipulation or the usage of the cultural instrument in the
labor market (Fang 2001) can improve the social efficiency. However, with the selective out-migration,
other disadvantaged subgroups losing the most talented may suffer further from having the worse
collective reputation, which may undermine solidarity in the disadvantaged population and cause
conflicts between the subgroups (Loury 2002).
Corollary 9 (Social Efficiency). The behavior of the social identity manipulation such as partial
passing may improve the social efficiency, and the usage of the observable cultural traits in the screening
process may cure to some extent the social inefficiency caused by the imperfect information in the labor
market.
Proof. Suppose both Πa0 and Π
a
0 are below pi
o. Without the usage of the cultural traits in the screening
process in the labor market, the total size of skilled workers would be (La + Lb)Πl. With the usage
of the cultural traits, the final state may approach either (L′′b ,H
′
a) or (H
′
b, L
′′
a), which means the total
size of skilled workers may approach either LbΠl + LaΠh or LaΠl + LbΠh. Both are greater than
(La + Lb)Πl . ¥
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4.3 Autonomous Emergence of an Elite Group among the Stereotyped
In this section, we show how a small elite subgroup with the unique cultural traits can emerge au-
tonomously among a negatively stereotyped population. First, the emergence is feasible whenever
there exists a sufficiently small subgroup with unique cultural traits that are expensive enough to ob-
tain for the other members in the stereotyped population except the most talented (Panel A in Figure
8). Second, the most talented members of a stereotyped population have an incentive to create a small
group with the observable distinguished cultural traits so that they can differentiate themselves from
the rest in the labor market (Panel B of Figure 8).
4.3.1 Small Cultural Group’s Growing as an Elite Group
We know that a symmetric initial position (Πl,Πl) is stable if the identity switch between the groups
is not allowed in the given model (Proposition 3). Once the switch is feasible, the symmetric initial
position (Πl,Πl) is not stable any more if the size disparity between the groups is sufficiently big,
which is implied in Corollary 4:
Lemma 9. The (Πb0,Π
a
0) is not stable at (Πl,Πl), when either L˜a > L˜
∗
a or L˜b > L˜
∗
b .
Proof. According to Corollary 4, Π˜i is zero when L˜i > L˜∗i . According to Theorem 1, the basin of
attraction for (Πl,Πl) is {0 ≤ Πa0 < Π˜a, 0 ≤ Πb0 < Π˜b}. Thus, with L˜i > L˜∗i , (Πl,Πl) cannot belong to
the basin of attraction for (Πl,Πl). ¥
Suppose (Πi0,Π
j
0) = (Πl,Πl) at time zero. If Li is small enough that L˜i(≡ Lj/Li) is greater than L˜∗i ,
Π˜i is equal to zero (Corollary 4) and, consequently, vi0 > v
∗, which means the medium investment cost
newborns with type i immediately invest in skills expecting the better group reputation and the more
preferential treatment in the future. Therefore, the group i’s reputation improves immediately beyond
the low reputation level Πl. The unequal reputations between two groups emerge autonomously as
the talented type-j newborns join group i (Corollary 7), and the final state approaches the asymmetric
stable state (Πi∞,Π
j∞) = (H ′i, L
′′
j ), as displayed in Panel A of Figure 8. Note that the instability of
(Πl,Πl) has arisen because the most talented of the disadvantaged population have an incentive to
join a small subgroup i expecting the fast reputation improvement of the group in the future with
their joining the subgroup and the increased skill investment activities among the type i newborns.
Thus, the above lemma implies the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (A Small Group’s Growing as Elite Group). Imagine a negatively stereotyped popula-
tion at the low reputation level Πl, which is a stable equilibrium in the no-switches dynamics. As far as
there exists a sufficiently small subgroup with unique cultural traits for which the switching cost is large
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enough that it satisfies Assumption 3, the most talented young members of the stereotyped population
have an incentive to differentiate themselves from the masses joining the small cultural subgroup. The
small subgroup emerges as an elite group out of the stereotyped population.
4.3.2 Endogenous Creation of Elite Group
So far, we have assumed that groups with different cultural traits are exogenously given. Imagine a
negatively stereotyped group B. If we allow that the most talented members of the stereotyped group
can find proper cultural indices for differentiation and create a distinguished cultural group A by
adopting specific indices, the condition in Lemma 9 is immediately satisfied because L˜a ≈ ∞ > L˜∗a, as
far as the chosen indices are rare in nature (La ≈ 0). Therefore, an elite group consisting of the most
talented can emerge immediately and the size of the group will grow over time, as described in Panel
B of Figure 8: the size of the created cultural group is close to zero in the beginning, but increases
up to Π′lLb. From the beginning, the reputation of the created group is one, which means that most
members of the group are skilled workers. The reputation of the stereotyped population will become
even worse over time as they lose the most talented newborns of the group to the distinguished cultural
group A. A real life example would be the migration of talented members of a stereotyped population
to specific residential areas that are not affordable to less talented peer members. Spending money
on luxury goods and designer clothing that are not affordable to other members of the stereotyped
population would be another example of differentiation by the most talented. They might also commit
to fine arts or send their children to a private boarding school to signal their higher social status to
outsiders.
Corollary 10 (Emergence of Elite Group). If the talented young members of a stereotyped group can
find proper cultural indices for differentiation, which are not affordable to other members of the group,
they will form an elite subgroup based on the indices, incurring a cost to obtain them. Through this,
they can immediately escape statistical discrimination practices and will be preferentially treated in the
labor market.
5 Conclusion
The externality of group reputation is important to explain the discriminatory practices by employers
and the different skill investment activities across social groups. In our previous work in Kim and
Loury (2008), we suggest the concept of a reputation trap by developing a dynamic model of group
reputation. Once a group’s collective reputation enters the range below a threshold, the group cannot
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escape the lower skill investment activities and the negative stereotype. A group with the reputation
above the threshold can build up its reputation through young members’ optimism about the future
and their collective action for skill achievement.
This paper discusses the identity-switching behaviors of the most talented young members of
a stereotyped population in a reputation trap, who have greater incentives to separate themselves
from the stereotyped masses. We have presented three different identity-switching activities for the
differentiation: passing, partial passing and elite culture development. Passing for an advantaged
group would be the most efficient way for differentiation if the identity switching cost is not large.
The most talented who succeed in passing can take advantage of the superior collective reputation of
the group immediately. We often observe the passing activities among the stereotyped population who
“fortunately” share a similar appearance with the advantaged population (eg. Korean descendants
in Japan). When passing is not available, the talented members of the stereotyped population may
consider the “partial” passing. They “pass” for the better-off subgroup with the unique cultural traits
in order to send signals of their higher productivity to employers. The partial passing is a common
activity among physically marked stereotyped people (eg. Blacks in the United States). Finally, the
most talented individuals may develop distinguished cultural indices that are not affordable to the less
talented members of the stereotyped population. The talented young members adopting the indices
may form an elite cultural subgroup, whose members are distinguished from the rest in the population
and who will be preferentially treated by employers.
Note that, in the given dynamic identity-switching model, we have simplified the composition of a
population in the following way. Group members are classified into three categories: the most talented,
the medium talented and the least talented. Each talent group is classified again into individuals with
higher switching cost and those with lower switching cost. Making some assumptions, we argue
that the most talented members with the lower switching cost are identified as the only potential
switchers who may consider the identity switching. The identification of the potential switchers
was an important starting point for the analysis of endogenous group formation. We were able to
find the exact dynamic paths tracing the decision-process of the potential switchers. However, some
researchers may generalize our findings using continuous distribution functions of skill investment costs
and switching costs, without introducing the potential switchers.
As we have discussed the endogenous group formation under the existence of group reputation ex-
ternality, we may develop a similar work under the existence of social network externality. Kim (2009)
developed a dynamic model of group inequality through the channel of social network externalities.
He suggested the concept of a network trap. Once the quality of a group’s social network enters some
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range below a threshold, the group cannot escape the low skill investment activities due to the negative
influence of the network effects. The most talented of a disadvantaged social group in the network
trap may consider switching to other social groups with a better network quality. There are several
practices of this kind that we may observe in the real world, such as people moving to a residential
area with more members of advantaged social groups, sending their children to a private school in
which descendants of the advantaged group are prevalent, and attending social clubs where they can
associate with members of advantaged social groups. If switching to advantaged social groups is not
possible, the most talented may build up an elite subgroup with entering barriers, separating them-
selves from the low quality social network. Because the most talented individuals of a disadvantaged
social group have a greater incentive to separate themselves from their peers than the most talented of
an advantaged social group, we might observe a more divisive culture among the disadvantaged group
than among the advantaged group. Some researchers may develop a dynamic model of endogenous
group formation through this channel of social network externality.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The results are driven using Lemma 2. The first argument is obvious because wPuδ+λ is max{Ri} and
wPq
δ+λ is min{Ri}, which means cl < min{Ri, R−i} and ch > max{Ri, R−i}. The second argument is
obvious as well because w(1−Pq)δ+λ is max{Y iq }, which means kh > max{Y iq }. By the above argument,
we need to check the following two newborn sorts for the third argument: (cm, kl) and (ch, kl).
[Newborns with Cost Set (cm, kl)] First, let us prove that they never switch their inborn types
when they have chosen to be unqualified, (i∗, e∗)|i,cm,kl 6= (−i, u). Suppose they can switch. Then, by
Lemma 2, kl < Y iu ≤ w(1−Pu)δ+λ . However, by Assumptions 2 and 3, cm+kl > wδ+λ and wPqδ+λ < cm < wPuδ+λ ,
which implies kl >
w(1−Pu)
δ+λ . Thus, they contradict each other. Second, let us prove that they never
switch their inborn types when they have chosen to be qualified: (i∗, e∗)|i,cm,kl 6= (−i, q). Suppose
they can switch. Then, by the lemma and equations (5) and (6), cm and kl should satisfy cm + kl <
R−i+Y iu =
wPq
δ+λ +
w(1−Pq)
δ+λ v
−i− w(1−Pu)δ+λ vi, which implies cm+ kl < wδ+λ . This contradicts Assumption
3.
[Newborns with Cost Set (ch, kl)] First, let us prove that they never switch their inborn types
when they have chosen to be unqualified: (i∗, e∗)|i,ch,kl 6= (−i, u). Suppose they can switch. Then, by
Lemma 2, kl < Y iu ≤ w(1−Pu)δ+λ . As shown already, kl > w(1−Pu)δ+λ by Assumptions 2 and 3. So, there is a
contradiction. Second, let us prove that they never switch their inborn types when they have chosen to
be qualified: (i∗, e∗)|i,ch,kl 6= (−i, q). Suppose they can switch. Then, by the lemma, ch < R−i ≤ wPuδ+λ ,
which contradicts Assumption 2. QED.
6.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Replacing M it with Li + ρLjΠ
′
l in equation (28), where ρ ∈ [0, 1], we have
Π˙it =
λ[(Liφit + LjΠ
′
l)− (Li + LjΠ′l)Πit]
Li + ρLjΠ′l
=
λ[Li(φit −Πit) + LjΠ′l(1−Πit)]
Li + ρLjΠ′l
=
λ[Li(φit −Πit) + LjΠ′l(1−Πit) + ρLjΠ′l(φit −Πit)− ρLjΠ′l(φit −Πit)]
Li + ρLjΠ′l
= λ(φit −Πit) +
λ[LjΠ′l(1−Πit − ρ(φit −Πit))]
Li + ρLjΠ′l
= Π˙nt +
λLjΠ′l[(1− ρ)(1−Πit) + ρ(1− φit)]
Li + ρLjΠ′l
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Since φit is either Πl or Πh, Π˙
i
t > Π˙
n
t except when Π
i
t = 1 and ρ = 0. Since ρ = 0 when time is X,
Π˙it > Π˙
n
t except when Π
i
X = 1. QED.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose that ΠjX ≥ pio. Then, vjX ≥ v∗ because the optimistic path to Qnh is available to group j.
Then, we have the following:
Y jq,X =
w(1− Pq)
δ + λ
· (viX − vjX)
≤ w(1− Pq)
δ + λ
· (1− v∗)
=
w
δ + λ
− cm − w(1− Pu)
δ + λ
· v∗
(
∵ v∗ ≡ (δ + λ)cm − wPq
w(Pu − Pq)
)
.
Thus, Y jq,X +
w(1−Pu)
δ+λ · v∗ ≤ wδ+λ − cm. Since wδ+λ − cm < kl by Assumption 2, Y jq,X < kl, which
contradicts to Proposition 2 that Y jq,X < kl when type-j potential switchers switch. QED.
6.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Replacing M jt with Lj − ρLjΠ′l in equation (37), where ρ ∈ [0, 1], we have
Π˙jt =
λLj [Πlη − (1−Π′l)Πjt ]
Lj − ρLjΠ′l
=
λLj [Πl −Πjt +Π′l(−1 + Πjt )]
Lj − ρLjΠ′l
=
λLj [Πl −Πjt +Π′l(−1 + Πjt )− ρΠ′l(Πl −Πjt ) + ρΠ′l(Πl −Πjt )]
Lj(1− ρΠ′l)
= λ(Πl −Πjt ) +
λLjΠ′l[−1 + Πjt + ρ(Πl −Πjt )]
Lj(1− ρΠ′l)
= Π˙nt +
λΠ′l[−1 + Πjt + ρ(Πl −Πjt )]
1− ρΠ′l
Therefore, as far as Πjt < 1, Π˙
j
t < Π˙
n
t . Since Π
j
X < pi
o (Lemma 5) and Πjt monotonically approaches
L′′j , Π
j
t < 1, ∀t ∈ (X,∞). QED.
6.5 Proof of Corollary 7
First, you may check the difference between pio′′a and pio′′b , using equations (38) and (39):
pio′′a − pio′′b =
[
Lb
La
− La
Lb
]
·Πl(1−Π∗)(1− vˆiX−
λ
δ+λ ) · [vˆiX/v∗]
λ
δ+λ . (46)
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Thus, when La < Lb, pio′′a < pio′′b . Also, you may check the partial derivative of pi
o′′
i with respect to Li:
∂pio′′i
∂Li
=
∂ΠˆiX
∂L˜i
· ∂L˜i
∂Li
· [vˆiX/v∗]
λ
δ+λ
= −Π′l(1−Π∗)(1− vˆiX−
λ
δ+λ ) · Lj
L2i
· [vˆiX/v∗]
λ
δ+λ > 0
Thus, the bigger the size of the group Li, the greater pio′′i , that is, the smaller the basin of attraction
for the attractor with H ′i. QED.
6.6 Proof of Corollary 8
The divergence occurs either in the basin of attraction for (L′′b ,H
′
a) or in that for (H
′
b, L
′′
a). We can
show that the basins tend to shrink with the greater η, or with the greater kl, using equations (38)
and (39):
∂pio′′i
∂η
=
∂Πˆi0
∂η
· [vˆi0/v∗]
λ
δ+λ
= −L˜iΠl(1−Π∗)(1− vˆi0−
λ
δ+λ ) · [vˆi0/v∗]
λ
δ+λ > 0
∂pio′′i
∂kl
= L˜iΠ′l(1−Π∗) · v∗−
λ
δ+λ · ∂vˆ
i
0
λ
δ+λ
∂kl
= L˜iΠ′l(1−Π∗) · v∗−
λ
δ+λ · ∂vˆ
i
0
λ
δ+λ
∂kl
> 0.
(
∵ vˆi0 =
(δ + λ)kl
w(1− Pq)
)
QED.
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Figure 7. Endogenous Group Formation 
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